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MSIE facilitates Cross Site Scripting

IE Crossite Scripting Chris Smith and me were investigating a strange Internet Explorer related problem in the last two days and it looks like IE has a flaw that makes cross site scripting on many sites possible.

The initial problem were spammers using open wikis to upload text files containing spammy HTML. At first we didn't understand why they would do that, as .txt files are served with a text/plain mime type and thus shouldn't be rendered by any browser. Well, we soon found that this is true for every browser, except for the Internet Explorer.

You probably know that on the web each served document or file is accompanied by a Content-Type header which tells the browser what type of data it is receiving. The browser then is supposed to use this info to decide what to do with the data, eg. rendering the HTML, downloading the file or give the data to a plugin.

So if a browser does not get a mime type registered for rendering HTML (usually text/html) it should not render it as HTML.

Well, Microsoft thought different and implemented something they call MIME Type Detection. It means they use the first few hundred bytes of the data and try to guess what the content is. This is a nice idea and even mentioned in RFC 2616:

If and only if the media type is not given by a Content-Type field, the recipient MAY attempt to guess the media type via inspection of its content […]

Unfortunately Microsoft got the order somehow tangled up: They ignore the sent type and do their guessing first. This of course violates the RFC, but is a well known fact: Phil Ringnalda wrote about it in 2004.

So how does that facilitate Cross Site Scripting? IE treats nearly everything1) as HTML that contains some tags in the first few hundred bytes. This includes the <script> tag.

Many web applications won't let you upload HMTL or JavaScript files to prevent XSS. But images or PDF documents for example aren't considered harmful and are often allowed. Yet I was able to construct such files with script code embedded which is executed by Internet Explorer.

IE executing Script code from a PNG comment Don't believe it? Here is a link to a 1x1 pixel white PNG image. Open it in Firefox or any other decent browser. It will be displayed fine. IE will treat it as HTML because it contains a script tag in the image comment. Note that this is a perfectly valid PNG image which I created in Gimp.

The next test object is a modified, simple "Hello World" PDF file. The Acrobat reader displays it fine2). Following the link in IE will execute the JavaScript.

So what does this mean? Wherever you allow upload of “harmless” files you might open a XSS vulnerability which could lead to IE user accounts compromised.

The solution? Hell, I don't know. We're still wondering about what we should do in DokuWiki about this. For now I recommend not allowing anonymous upload of any files.

PS: I tested the above files with MSIE 6.0.2900.2180.xpsp_sp2_gdr.050301-1519 on Windows XP. From different tests yesterday I know for sure that the same mime type guessing is still used in IE7. If the specific flaws shown above still exist I cannot say, but I guess so.

Tags:
msie, xss, security
Similar posts:
1) ironically it depends on the initially sent mime type, only if it matches one of the 26 very common types known by the FindMimeFromData function, the guessing will overrule the type
2) though I can not guarantee this is a valid PDF, it was just a quick try without a look at the PDF specs
Posted on Monday, February the 12th 2007 (8 years ago).

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